Silent Hunter is the definitive World War 2 submarine game. It puts you in command of the U.S. submarines that challenged the Imperial Japanese Navy from the Philippine Islands to the Sea of Japan. You will conduct war patrols similar to those made in the Pacific Theater during the war. You will experience the problems this brave group of World War 2 submariners faced. Most importantly, this unique submarine simulation game will give you a keen appreciation of the contribution American submariners made in stopping and ultimately defeating Japanese aggression in the Pacific Theater.
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| Silent Hunter Commander's Edition World War 2 submarine simulation CD cover. |
The Pacific Thunder Campaign was conceived in 1999 by a dedicated group of World War 2 submarine enthusiasts. The campaign provides a structured environment for using the Silent Hunter submarine game to simulate U.S. submarine operations in the Pacific Theater from December 1941 to August 1945. The theme of the Pacific Thunder Campaign is historical realism. The campaign was not designed to provide a forum for gamers who are seeking an arcade to compete for high tonnage scores. We use several software utilities specifically designed for the Pacific Thunder Campaign to supplement the historical realism already built into Silent Hunter's artificial intelligence. For example, an historical realism patch changes the dimensions and displacements of the merchant ships encountered during war patrols to more accurately reflect vessels historically in service, and a patrol zone selector allows skippers to deploy their boats in areas specified in war patrol orders. In order to ensure that new campaign applicants understand our emphasis on historical realism, they are required to attend our Submarine School, where a former U.S. submarine officer provides them with training missions and familiarizes them with our Rules of Engagement and Standard Operating Procedures. Upon successful completion of our Submarine School, graduates are assigned to a Pacific Fleet submarine squadron and receive their boat assignments. Each campaign cycle, the Commander, Submarines Pacific Fleet (ComSubPac) issues war patrol orders to the fleet. Each submarine squadron commander, in turn, issues specific deployment orders to the submarine skippers under his command. The war patrol orders are carefully researched and historically accurate. In addition to being ordered to deploy their boats in specific patrol zones, submarine skippers are instructed to observe standing tactical procedures regarding torpedo depth settings, target priorities, and concealment. Following completion of their war patrols, submarine skippers submit a written patrol report to ComSubPac and their squadron commanders. The patrol reports are reviewed to ensure that the submarine skippers conducted their patrols in compliance with the Rules of Engagement and Standard Operating Procedures.
The following paragraphs provide a precis of the U.S. submarine war against Japan. It is provided to help you understand why we emphasize historical realism.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet and placed the American Navy in a defensive posture. The U.S. Submarine Force was the only weapon system immediately available to take the war to the enemy. The 29 Asiatic Fleet and 27 Pacific Fleet submarines were ordered to immediately commence unrestricted submarine warfare against all Japanese merchant and military assets. The story of how the U.S. Submarine Force went on the offensive against Japanese merchant shipping and Japanese fleet units is at the heart of Silent Hunter. It is the greatest story in the history of naval warfare.
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| Officer at periscope in control room of U.S. submarine, circa 1942. Public domain. |
The American Navy achieved a spectacular victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy due in large part to the accomplishments and sacrifices of the U.S. Submarine Force. Of the 8.1 million tons of Japanese merchant vessels lost during the war, U.S. submarines accounted for 4.9 million tons in 1,113 vessels, 60 percent of the total losses. In addition, U.S. submarines sank 540,192 tons of Japanese naval ships including 8 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship and 11 cruisers. Taken together, the two tonnage figures represent 54.6 percent of all Japanese naval and merchant vessel losses. The U.S. Submarine Force consisted of about 50,000 personnel, including staffs and other positions. These 50,000 personnel represented only 1.6 percent of the entire U.S. Navy. A total of 288 American submarines were deployed throughout the war, including in the Atlantic Theater. Fifty-two submarines were lost with 48 destroyed in the war zones of the Pacific. The 3,500 submariners who manned them were lost and remain on eternal patrol. American submariners suffered the highest loss rate in the U.S. Armed Forces, with 22 percent killed.
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| Torpedoed Japanese destroyer photographed through periscope of U.S.S. Wahoo or U.S.S. Nautilus, June 1942. Public domain. |
The American submarine force overcame significant obstacles in achieving victory over Japan. The Submarine Force was not prepared to conduct a guerre de course, the concept of employing naval forces against an opposing merchant marine. Their peacetime training had focused on fleet operations, in keeping with naval doctrine articulated by the American theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan. According to Mahan, destruction of the enemy's battle fleet was required to ensure effective control of the sea. During peacetime years, the U.S. Submarine Force had therefore trained to become part of the American battle fleet and to sink major enemy warships. The fleet submarines were designed with this concept in mind. It took many months for the U.S. Submarine Force to develop new strategy and tactics to use against the Japanese merchant marine. American submariners had to overcome the paradigm instilled by over cautious and unrealistic peacetime training that attacks had to be made from deep submergence, using sonar apparatus, in order to avoid detection and destruction by the enemy. It would take the elevation of a new breed of bold and innovative skippers before successful tactics, such as night surface attacks, daylight periscope attacks, and night periscope attacks, were accepted. It would also take many months before the Submarine Force leadership realized that the Japanese war machine was hurt more by successful attacks against its merchant vessels than by fruitless attempts to sink major warships solely to garner political capital and media headlines.
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| Crewmen transferring a torpedo from a submarine tender to a submarine about to leave on war patrol, circa May 1945. Public domain. National Archives at College Park, MD. |
Perhaps the greatest obstacle faced by the Submarine Force was the scandal surrounding defective torpedoes. The American boats were sent to war with torpedoes that had never been thoroughly tested against live targets. Early in the war, submarine skippers realized something was seriously wrong as properly aimed torpedoes failed to detonate or exploded prematurely. Initially, the blame for these problems was attributed to deficient firing solutions and ordnance handling by the skippers and crews. It was not until September 1943, after much political wrangling and numerous missed opportunities to inflict damage to Japanese merchant and naval shipping, that the problem with defective magnetic and contact exploders was corrected. For twenty-one months, American submariners went on the offensive against the enemy with weapons that did not work.
In addition to its significant contribution to the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the U.S. Submarine Force's efforts had far reaching consequences for the entire Japanese war machine. By destroying a significant percentage of the merchant vessels used to import critical raw materials, such as oil, bauxite, rubber, pig iron, and food, Japan was not able to meet the needs of its wartime civilian and industrial economy. As a result Japan was not able to adequately supply the immense logistical needs of its army. Japan's aircraft production dropped markedly due to the shortage of raw materials and fuel. Finally, the American Submarine Force's destruction of Japanese merchant shipping forced the enemy to focus industrial resources on building merchant vessels to replace losses. This resulted in a reduction of potential naval construction.
Please refer to the Pacific Thunder Campaign FAQ and Enlistment Form for additional information about our organization.
Sources:
Blair, Clay. Silent Victory. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencourt and Co., 1975.
Holmes, W.J. Undersea Victory: The Influence of Submarine Operations on the War in the Pacific. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966.
Poirer, Michel Thomas, Commander, U.S. Navy. Results of the German and American Submarine Campaigns of World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy, 1999.
Roscoe, Theodore. U.S. Submarine Operations in World War II. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1949.
